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PRACTICE SETTING AS AN ORGANIZING THEME FOR A
LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING CURRICULUM
JAMES E. MoLrrERNo"
I. INTRODUCTION
The law and ethics of lawyering is now a distinct area of sub-
stantive law with a distinct place in the legal academy. Twenty-
plus years of work by pioneers in the area' has moved both the
law that governs lawyers and its teaching from Watergate-in-
duced forced entry into the legal academy to near-equal status
among subjects in the law curriculum. The substantive law of
lawyering area now has its own Restatement,' an unusually di-
verse wealth of teaching materials and methodologies, and a
vital and well-developed scholarly community. Much remains to
be done, to be sure, but the progress in the law of lawyering
during the past twenty years has been more pronounced than in
most other substantive law areas.
The substance of the law of lawyering draws on contract, tort,
agency, property, procedure, etc., but so do many upper-division
subjects, such as administrative law, corporations, and criminal
procedure. That is why university legal education traditionally
has been organized around the teaching of a set of core courses
in the first year followed by elective offerings, many of which
draw upon the principles of the first year's basic curriculum.
As the substance of the area matures and the need to teach
beyond the basic course emerges, the law of lawyering needs to
pursue and develop its own jurisprudence, a jurisprudence of
* Vice Dean and Professor of Law, William & Mary School of Law. I am grate-
ful to the W.M. Keck Foundation for its generous support of the conference at Wil-
liam & Mary for which this paper was written. Thanks also to Karin Larson, Glenn
Walberg, and David Saiki for excellent research assistance.
1. See, e.g., Thomas D. Morgan, Use of the Problem Method for Teaching Legal
Ethics, 39 WM. & MARY L. REv. 409, 411 (1998).
2. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS chs. 2, 3, 5, 8
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996); id. chs. 4, 6, 7 (Tentative Draft No. 8, 1997).
393
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
lawyering.3 To do so, we must find central organizing themes
for the substantive law, and the attendant distinctions that
guide curricular design will flow. Important curricular choices
face us: should course offerings beyond the basic course be orga-
nized by doctrinal topic,4 by relationship with other substantive
law areas,5 by practice setting,6 or by some other factor? This
Article is about the curricular implications of finding one aspect
of such an organizing theme. I propose that practice setting
become the primary organizing factor for curricular development
in the law of lawyering area.
II. THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING IS ORGANIZED BY
PRACTICE SETTING
Lawyers in different practice settings behave according to dif-
ferent sets of norms. In other words, the ethics of lawyering var-
ies according to the practice setting in which the affected
lawyer's work exists. Because defining much of the law of law-
yering depends on the norms of practice, so too the law of law-
yering varies according to the practice setting in which the af-
fected lawyer's work exists. The simplistic notion that one set of
legal rules, the American Bar Association's (ABA) Model Rules
("Model Rules")7 as modified by adoption in a particular juris-
diction, for example, govern every lawyer subject to their juris-
diction in precisely the same way is well behind us. Even the
Model Rules acknowledge as much by their inclusion of rules
that have application in only certain practice settings,' and by
the comments to other rules that establish practice-setting dis-
3. See David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARv. L. REV. 468, 474
(1990).
4. Under such a regime, course offerings beyond the basic course might be called,
for example, Confidentiality or Conflicts of Interest or Limitations on Client-Getting
Activity, just as upper-division torts electives are called Products Liability or
Worker's Compensation.
5. For example, substantial legal areas could be addressed in courses entitled
Tort Aspects of the Law of Lawyering or Agency Law in the Lawyer Context.
6. For example, practice setting courses could be entitled Criminal Defense, Cor-
porate Practice, Government Agency Lawyers or Child Advocacy Practice.
7. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1995).
8. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13 (1983) (discuss-
ing the lawyer's representation of an organization).
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tinct norms or practice-interpretive principles.9 In sociological
terms, expecting differences in norms from practice setting to
practice setting is only a small step from Talcott Parsons's situa-
tional orientation theory explaining what motivates individuals
to act as they do.'"
In order to know much about the differences in the law of law-
yering that attend changes in practice setting, one must exam-
ine the culture of the particular practice settings," the nature
of the lawyer-client relationship in the setting, and, to some
extent, the substantive law upon which lawyers in the practice
setting operate.
For example, in many respects the law that governs lawyers'
conduct in the criminal defense practice setting differs from the
law that governs lawyers' conduct in the in-house corporate
counsel practice setting. 2 To know how the law should differ
between these two diverse practice settings, one examines the
differences in culture between the two practice settings, the dif-
ferences in lawyer-client relationships between the two, and, to
some extent, the differences in substantive law between criminal
law and corporate law. The differences in the law that governs
the lawyers' conduct will diminish, though perhaps not entirely
disappear, when the corporate lawyer finds herself defending the
corporation against criminal charges.
The mere fact that principles from various areas of law are
pulled together to form parts of another area is insufficient rea-
son to spread the teaching of that other area throughout the
curriculum. Although the law and ethics of lawyering pulls prin-
ciples from a variety of other substantive law areas, the same
can be said of corporate law, for example, and several other sub-
jects typically taught in the second or third year. The mere fact
that an area of law draws much from these core subjects has
9. See, e.g., id. Rule 4.1 cmt. 2.
10. See generally TALCOrr PARSONS, The Professions and Social Structure, in ES-
SAYS IN SOcIOLOGICAL THEORY 34, 43-46 (1954) (analyzing the relation of motivation
to institutional patterns).
11. See Thomas B. Metzloff, Seeing the Trees Within the Forest: Contextualized
Ethics Courses as a Strategy for Teaching Legal Ethics, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Summer-Autumn 1995, at 227, 229.
12. See infra notes 19-27 and accompanying text.
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never meant, and should not mean for the law of lawyering, that
the area should be taught throughout the curriculum or that its
teaching should be organized around the connections it has with
other substantive law areas. Professional responsibility law uses
agency principles;13 so does corporate law." Professional re-
sponsibility law uses tort principles; 5 so does corporate law."
Professional responsibility law uses contract principles;" so
does corporate law.18 Professional responsibility law has a core
of its own that in some respects is dependent on "other law"; so
does corporate law. Does anyone suggest that corporate law
should be taught not in its own course, but rather by sprinkling
it across a variety of courses from whose substantive law princi-
ples it draws or by putting significant portions of its teaching
into the hands of teachers of other subjects even if it also has its
own course?
The law of corporations, like the law of lawyering, has its own
jurisprudence, its own central principles that animate its study
and practice. The thought that legal education should rely on
13. See, e.g., In re Goldstein, 85 A.2d 361, 363 (Del. 1951) (disciplining a lawyer
who used client confidences for personal gain for breach of trust and noting "a law-
yer is not permitted to traffic in his client's affairs for his own profit"); MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(b).
14. See Philadelphia, Wilmington & Baltimore R.R. v. Quigley, 62 U.S. 202, 210
(1858); Palazzo v. Gulf Oil Corp., 764 F.2d 1381, 1385 (11th Cir. 1985); Michael E.
Baughman, Defining the Boundaries of the Adverse Domination Doctrine: Is There
Any Repose for Corporate Directors?, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1065, 1093 n.124 (1995);
Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV.
1276, 1305 (1984).
15. See, e.g., Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d 704, 710 (Minn. 1962) (holding
that fraudulent nondisclosure of a material fact vitiated settlement contract); MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble, Scope and Terminology (1995) (defining
the terms "fraud" and "fraudulent").
16. See, e.g., Magnum Foods, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co., 36 F.3d 1491, 1499
(10th Cir. 1994); Phoenix Sav. & Loan, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 427 F.2d 862,
868 (4th Cir. 1970); Larry E. Ribstein, Writing About and Teaching Corporate Law:
Reflections on Corporate Law and Economic Analysis, 40 EMORY L.J. 509 (1991)
(book review).
17. See, e.g., Rosenberg v. Levin, 409 So. 2d 1016, 1021 (Fla. 1982) (regarding
contract rights analysis applicable upon lawyer discharge); MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16(a)(3).
18. See Ainsworth v. Southwestern Drug Corp., 95 F.2d 172, 173 (5th Cir. 1938);
Gross v. Texas Plastics Inc., 344 F. Supp. 564, 566 (D.N.J. 1972), affd, 523 F.2d
1050 (3d Cir. 1975); Ribstein, supra note 16, at 522.
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Torts, Contracts, Constitutional Law, Property, Civil Procedure,
and Criminal Law teachers to convey the animating principles of
corporation law by inserting some coverage of corporation law
topics that are in one way or another connected to their respec-
tive courses is utterly foreign. To convey those animating princi-
ples, an area of the law needs its own course and curriculum,
organized by its own principles, and taught by experts in that
field.
The question then, for organizational purposes, is: By what
factor is the law and ethics of lawyering organized? There may
of course be multiple factors, but chief among them is the prac-
tice setting of the governed lawyer. What are the clues to identi-
fying this organizational factor?
A. Practice Norms
Lawyers engaged in various practice settings have attempted
to establish their rules and ethics apart from those of other law-
yers. Some have attempted to draft model ethics rules for their
practice setting. 9 The creation of these expressions of what is
different about the norms of practice in particular practice set-
tings offers both insight and teaching material upon which to
draw in a course about a particular practice setting.
B. Law of Lawyering
The law of lawyering distinguishes lawyers in different practice
settings. Even viewing the law of lawyering in the narrowest
possible way-merely the Model Rules and their interpretations
by courts-it is clear that the law of lawyering differs from prac-
tice setting to practice setting in critical ways. Indeed, it must be
so because the essence of the lawyer's role differs from practice
setting to practice setting. The Model Rules themselves acknowl-
edge as much by their inclusion of rules that have application in
only certain practice settings,20 and by the comments to other
19. See, e.g., Robert Aronson et al., Bounds of Advocacy, American Academy of
Matrimonial Lawyers, Standards of Conduct, in 9 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW 1
(1992).
20. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13.
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rules that establish norms-of-practice interpretive principles.2
Implications of the confidentiality rules are different according
to practice setting. Special implications of confidentiality apply
to in-house corporate counsel,22 government practice,' crimi-
nal practice, both prosecution' and defense,' and insurance
defense,2" among others.
Circumstances that would present conflicts of interest in one
practice setting do not do so in others. 7 The definition of a par-
ty or person for purposes of Model Rule 4.2 changes from prac-
tice setting to practice setting." Even the fundamental mea-
sure of diligence and loyalty to the client vary in different prac-
tice settings. 9
Some of the Model Rules rely on what amounts to "trade us-
age" in the practice, which also differs from one practice setting
to another, changing the law that governs lawyers in those prac-
tice settings accordingly. When Model Rule 4.1 defines the law
governing negotiation conduct by reference to what amounts to
21. See, e.g., id. Rule 4.1 cmt.
22. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 391 (1981); Kachmar v.
Sunguard Data Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 173, 179 (3d Cir. 1997); Hull v. Celanese Corp.,
375 F. Supp. 922, 923 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), affd, 513 F.2d 568 (2d Cir. 1975).
23. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2482 (1997).
24. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8(d).
25. See, e.g., People v. Meredith, 631 P.2d 46, 53 (Cal. 1981).
26. See, e.g., Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d 704, 711 (Minn. 1962).
27. See, e.g., Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988) (recognizing that
there are special considerations in criminal defense of multiple clients); Molins PLC
v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1179, 1185 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (noting that patent law
dictates disclosures of copending applications, leading to possible conflict among
lawyer's clients); In re McKinney Ranch Assocs., 62 B.R. 249, 254 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
1986) (explaining that special duties implicated in bankruptcy practice dictate broad-
er than normal disqualification of lawyers); United States v. Linton, 502 F. Supp.
871, 876 (D. Nev. 1980) (recognizing that there are special conflicts in corporate
practice between representation of the entity and the employees).
28. See, e.g., United States v. Lemonakis, 485 F.2d 941, 955 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (re-
ferring to criminal suspects as "parties"); Vega v. Bloomsburgh, 427 F. Supp. 593,
595 (D. Mass. 1977) (referring to government employees as "parties"); Niesig v. Team
I, 558 N.E.2d 1030, 1035 (N.Y. 1990) (referring to corporate employees as "parties").
29. See, e.g., Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) (limiting criminal defense
zealousness); United States v. LaRouche Campaign, 682 F. Supp. 610, 614 (D. Mass.
1987) (defining prosecutor's diligence), afl'd, 866 F.2d 512 (1st Cir. 1989); Westlake
v. Abrams, 504 F. Supp. 337, 342 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (outlining differences in zealous-
ness and moral responsibility between lawyer litigation and planning activities).
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trade usage, it implicitly creates a rule of law that varies from
practice setting to practice setting." Acceptable practice rules
of the negotiation game are different in labor practice than in,
say, family law practice or criminal law practice. Although these
differences are, to some extent, referenced by differences in the
substantive labor, family, and criminal law, they are to an even
greater extent the product of the varying practice cultures and
norms in these different practice settings. As such, if it is help-
ful to teach professional responsibility law as one part of a vari-
ety of different substantive law courses, the primary reason for
doing so is to teach the norms of the practice-setting cultures
that attend the substantive law field being taught.
C. Scholarship
The scholarship has begun to develop around practice-setting
distinctions. Scholarship on professional ethics law as it relates
to specific practice settings is current and rich."' This material
is at least as much about the practice settings, and the atten-
dant trade usage of them, as it is about the imported law of
torts, family law, administrative law, corporations, criminal law,
and so on upon which lawyers in these various practice settings
operate.
Working with the writing of key jurisprudence-of-lawyering
scholars is advanced by a practice-setting orientation. Practice-
setting distinctions are a key ingredient in an effort to apply and
appreciate the lessons of Bill Simon, David Wilkins, or David
Luban, for example.32 Knowing in what practice setting a law-
30. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.1 (1995).
31. See, e.g., Kathleen Clark, Do We Have Enough Ethics in Government Yet?: An
Answer from Fiduciary Theory, 1996 U. ILL. L. REv. 57; David Luban, Are Criminal
Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1729 (1993); Michael J. Mahoney & Allison
Taylor Blizzard, Ethical Issues in the Context of International Litigation: "Where
Angels Fear to Tread," 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 933 (1995); Charles Silver & Kent
Syverud, The Professional Responsibilities of Insurance Defense Lawyers, 45 DUKE
L.J. 255 (1995); William H. Simon, The Ethics of Criminal Defense, 91 MICH. L.
REV. 1703 (1993); Symposium, Recommendations of the Conference on Ethical Issues
in the Legal Representation of Children, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1301 (1996).
32. See, e.g., DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988); Wil-
liam H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 29; William H. Simon,
Should Lawyers Obey the Law?, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 217 (1996); David B.
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yer exists tells a great deal about who should regulate that
particular lawyer, what circumstances should dictate whether
the lawyer should obey or not obey the law, and the breadth
of ethical discretion that the lawyer has available to her.3"
Their own scholarship, and others, has in some instances fol-
lowed the practice-setting organizational theme."
D. Professional Development
As the legal universe and practice in particular continue to
become more complex, the likelihood that individual lawyers
will spend a career in a limited range of practice settings in-
creases. Lawyers have changed and will continue to change
employment situations more and more frequently," but they
are also more likely to stay within a relatively small range
of practice areas because of the significant investment neces-
sary to achieve competence in a particular area. As such, the
law and ethics of lawyering will continue to grow more spe-
cialized by practice setting as well.
Of the possible organizing themes, the practice-setting
theme offers the greatest promise for the development of a
coherent jurisprudence of lawyering and a coherent, multipart
curriculum for the law and ethics of lawyering.
Wilkins, In Defense of Law and Morality: Why Lawyers Should Have a Prima Facia
Duty to Obey the Law, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 269 (1996); David B. Wilkins, Legal
Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REv. 468 (1990); David B. Wilkins, Who Should
Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 801 (1992) [hereinafter Wilkins, Who Should
Regulate Lawyers?].
33. See Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, supra note 32, at 814-19.
34. See, e.g., Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal
Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469 (1966); Rory
K Little, Who Should Regulate the Ethics of Federal Prosecutors?, 65 FORDHAM L.
REV. 355 (1996); Luban, supra note 31; Simon, supra note 31; Fred C. Zacharias,
Who Can Best Regulate the Ethics of Federal Prosecutors, or, Who Should Regulate
the Regulators?: Response to Little, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 429 (1996).
35. See RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 239 (1989).
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III. CURRENTLY USED CURRICULUM ADDITIONS TO THE BASIC
COURSE COULD BE ORGANIZED BY PRACTICE SETTING
As the law of lawyering has become more complex, the need
for multiple courses in the curriculum to cover its major compo-
nents has emerged. 6 The basic course exists in a wide variety
of formats, certainly wider than the basic course in any other
substantive law area covered in the curriculum. The two- or
three-credit, free-standing basic course is by far the most popu-
lar,"7 but the basic course also exists in the form of free-stand-
ing pervasive method, 8 first-year live-client clinic, 9 upper-di-
vision live-client clinic,40 long-term simulation,4' single semes-
ter simulation,42 a menu of contextualized choices,43 and the
short-term blitz." By whatever formula it is designed, the basic
course is now a given in legal education.45
But the basic course is no longer enough, if it ever was. The
mission of this area of law teaching is broader than that of other
areas, encompassing not only the substantive law and the analy-
36. See Mary C. Daly et al., Contextualizing Professional Responsibility: A New
Curriculum for a New Century, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer-Autumn 1995, at
193.
37. See PROFESSIONALISM COMM., AMERICAN BAR ASSN, TEACHING AND LEARNING
PROFESSIONALISM 40 (1996) [hereinafter TEACHING AND LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM].
38. For example, Stanford uses this method. See Deborah L. Rhode, Into the Val-
ley of Ethics: Professional Responsibility and Educational Reform, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Summer-Autumn 1995, at 139.
39. See David Luban & Michael Millemann, Good Judgment: Ethics Teaching in
Dark Times, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 31 (1995).
40. See Thomas L. Shaffer, On Teaching Legal Ethics in the Law Office, 71 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 605 (1996).
41. See James E. Moliterno, Legal Education, Experiential Education, and Profes-
sional Responsibility, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 71 (1996).
42. See Robert P. Burns, Teaching the Basic Ethics Class Through Simulation: The
Northwestern Program in Advocacy and Professionalism, LAw & CONTEMp. PROBS.,
Summer-Autumn 1995, at 37.
43. See Daly et al., supra note 36.
44. See Carol Bensinger Liebman, The Profession of Law: Columbia Law School's
Use of Experiential Learning Techniques to Teach Professional Responsibility, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer-Autumn 1995, at 73; Metzloff, supra note 11 (describing
Duke Law School's short course).
45. Most of the design choices for the basic course are described and evaluated in
James E. Moliterno, An Analysis of Ethics Teaching in Law Schools: Replacing Lost
Benefits of the Apprentice System in the Academic Atmosphere, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 83
(1991).
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sis skills that attend the teaching of other areas in the curricu-
lum, but also moral development. 4' As well, the substantive law
of lawyering has exploded. The adoption of new test specifica-
tions for the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination
(MPRE) acknowledges that explosion by employing a "law-gov-
erning-lawyers approach."47 The scope of the new specifications
indicates the breadth and complexity of the law of lawyering
area.4" The basic course cannot do justice to the subject, any
more than the basic Torts course could do justice to the complex-
ity of that area without the offering of Products Liability, Com-
pensation Systems, etc. Indeed, because of the moral develop-
ment mission and the centrality of the law of lawyering to the
life of nearly every law graduate, the argument for more than
the basic course is stronger for the law of lawyering than it is
for any other area of law.
By what theme, then, should the curriculum be organized be-
yond the basic course? I suggest that it should be organized not
by substantive law connections but by practice setting.
Currently, in addition to being variously used as the basic
course, live-client clinics, contextualized courses, pervasive
method infusion into the curriculum, and simulations are used as
additions to the basic course. Any of the four can in some circum-
stances be used to support practice-setting organized offerings.
A. Clinics
Many clinics are, and others could be, organized and struc-
tured to teach their practice setting, most classically the civil
public service practice setting." In many ways, clinics have
taught the special aspects of the lawyer's role in public service
settings since the Council on Legal Education for Professional
Responsibility (CLEPR) days and before."0 When clinics focus
46. See Lisa G. Lerman, Teaching Moral Perception and Moral Judgment in Legal
Ethics Courses: A Dialogue about Goals, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 457 (1998).
47. Memorandum from the National Conference of Bar Examiners to Law School
Deans 2 (Aug. 21, 1997) (on file with author) (announcing the new test specifica-
tions, outlining the subject matter covered, and describing the test).
48. See id.
49. See Report of the Committee on the Future of the In-House Clinic, 42 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 508, 513-16 (1992).
50. See, e.g., William Pincus, Legal Education in a Service Setting, in CLINICAL
402 [Vol. 39:393
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on the practice setting and are accompanied by readings and
seminar sessions that address the culture and special rules of
lawyering that most affect the public service practice setting,
they are already an important aspect of a school's law and ethics
of lawyering curriculum.
Live-client clinics have expanded well beyond the general civil
public service practice setting5 to criminal defense and prose-
cution settings, to include, for example, family law practice52
and health care practice. 3
To an extent, externships with sound seminar components
can work similarly. The practice settings for externships are
boundless.
B. Contextualized Courses
Creating full-semester contextualized courses that focus on
areas of practice, such as corporate practice, criminal law prac-
tice, and public service practice is one way to build 'a curriculum
beyond the basic course.' These courses were designed specifi-
cally to teach the law and ethics of lawyering for particular prac-
tice settings or employment circumstances.55 Created expressly
for this purpose, these courses have significant promise for be-
coming the core of an advanced law and ethics of lawyering cur-
riculum organized by practice setting. To do so, they should exist
as additions to the basic course rather than as substitutes for it,
as they currently exist at some schools. Nonetheless, these
courses are designed to take advantage of the soundest and most
promising of the possible organizing themes. Some of the
contextualized courses use traditional teaching methodologies,
EDUCATION FOR THE LAW STUDENT 27, 28 (CLEPR ed., 1973).
51. See, e.g., Howard S. Erlanger & Gabrielle Lessard, Mobilizing Law Schools in
Response to Poverty: A Report on Experiments in Progress, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 199
(1993).
52. See, e.g., id at 213, 215 (describing a juvenile law clinic and a battered
women's clinic).
53. See, e.g., id. at 216 (describing Gary Bellow's legal-medical services project).
54. See Daly et al., supra note 36, at 193; Bruce A. Green, Less is More: Teaching
Legal Ethics in Context, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 357, 370-77 (1998); Metzloff, supra
note 11, at 228.
55. See Daly et al., supra note 36, at 193.
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such as classroom analysis of cases and materials, while others
use experiential methodologies.56
C. Pervasive Method
The growth in popularity of the pervasive method in recent
years has been astounding. Approximately two-thirds of the
schools responding to the recent ABA survey indicated that they
had implemented some form of pervasive method program, and
interest is on the rise.57
Fortunately, only a few of the schools using the pervasive
method use the method as a replacement for a basic, required
course. 8 As a replacement for the basic course, the pervasive
method is doomed to fail: without the basic course, pervasive
method offers too little and inconsistent coverage by faculty
without expertise.59 Such a regime would be without a theme
and could never produce a jurisprudence of lawyering. Fortu-
nately, though, in its modern version, the pervasive method is
seen as an addition and not a replacement for the basic profes-
sional responsibility course.
The modem pervasive method is organized primarily accord-
ing to connections between the law of lawyering and other sub-
stantive topics." The polestar text for teaching by the pervasive
method follows the basic, cross-cutting material with matters to
be taught in "civil procedure, constitutional law, contracts, cor-
porations, criminal law and procedure, evidence and trial advo-
cacy, family law, property, tax, and torts."6' The "central claim
[of the pervasive method] is that legal ethics deserves discussion
in all substantive areas because it arises in all substantive ar-
eas."62 The text offers topics to be covered, some of which are
56. See id.
57. See TEACHING AND LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM, supra note 37, at 42-43.
58. See Deborah L. Rhode, Pervasive Ethics: The Professional Responsibilities of
Professional Schools, in ABA SYMPOSIUM ON TEACHING & LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM
tab 3, at 1-2 (1996).
59. See id. at 7.
60. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: ETHICS BY THE PERVA-
SIVE METHOD 4-5 (1994).
61. Id. at 5.
62. Id. at 3.
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subject-matter connected while others are practice-setting con-
nected. In the torts chapter, topics include "Frivolous Cases and
Malicious Prosecution"' and "Competence and Malpractice,"'
which seem subject-matter connected. "Joint Representation,"
addressing representation of personal injury plaintiffs and
insurers/insureds,65 and "Solicitation" in the context of personal
injury plaintiff practice,66 seem practice-setting connected but
are also covered in the torts chapter. Similarly, the constitu-
tional- law chapter topics include "Freedom of Expression and
Association," addressing limitations on the bar's power to regu-
late lawyer conduct, 7 which seems subject-matter connected,
and "Representing Groups"68 and "Representing the Govern-
ment,"69 which seem practice-setting connected. Other chapters
are mixed similarly between the two rationales, with the balance
appearing to slightly favor the subject matter connectedness
rationale.
If we try to teach professional ethics law by a pervasive meth-
od, that is by teaching parts of it in a variety of courses, then we
would do better to focus on the practice settings typical of law-
yers who are working with the course's substantive law topics:
in-house and outside corporate counsel for Corporations; public
defenders, prosecutors, and private criminal defense practices
for Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure; insurance defense
and plaintiff's personal injury for Torts and Products Liability;
and government agency practice for Administrative Law. The
law of lawyering differs by practice setting, not by connections
with the substance of various law topics. The pervasive method
as presently conceived is organized primarily around the less
than optimal theme: rather than being pervasive or divided up
by substantive law course or subject area, the law and ethics of
lawyering is more usefully organized around diversity of practice
settings.
63. Id. at 842.
64. Id. at 859.
65. Id. at 848.
66. Id. at 859.
67. Id. at 528.
68. Id. at 506.
69. Id. at 517.
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D. Practice-Setting Specific Simulations
Practice-setting specific simulations have proliferated in re-
cent years. They simulate a range of settings that include corpo-
rate practice, 70 estate-planning practice 7 1 labor,72 administra-
tive agency practice, 3 and general commercial practice. 4
Many of these new simulation experiments are conducted as
part of the related substantive law course. Because practice set-
ting is a more efficacious organizing theme for the law of law-
yering, practice-setting specific simulations, which coincide with
the appropriate substantive law courses, should produce greater
pervasive method benefits than merely having the corporations
professor teach the aspects of the law of corporations that are
imported into professional ethics law.
Through these practice-setting focused teaching, learning and
research vehicles, a jurisprudence of lawyering may be fully de-
veloped. The offerings would, one might say, provide a pervasion
of contextualized experiential education. They would pervade the
curriculum in much the same way that the pervasive method
coverage does. They would be contextualized in the best sense,
teaching about a particular set of practice settings, and they
would be experiential, placing students in the role of lawyers in
the particular practice setting. 5
IV. CONCLUSION
The most efficient and constructive organizational theme for
the law and ethics of lawyering curriculum is practice setting.
70. See, e.g., Lynne L. Dallas, Limited-Time Simulations in Business Law Classes,
45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 487 (1995); Karl S. Okamoto, Learning and Learning-to-Learn by
Doing: Simulating Corporate Practice in Law School, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 498 (1995).
71. See Thomas A. Robinson, Simulated Legal Education: A Template, 42 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 296 (1992).
72. See Roberto L. Corrada, A Simulation of Union Organizing in a Labor Law
Class, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 445 (1996).
73. See Kristine Strachan, Curricula Reform in the Second and Third Years: Struc-
ture, Progression, and Integration, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 523, 527 (1989).
74. See John F. Dolan & Russell A. McNair, Jr., Teaching Commercial Law in the
Third Year: A Short Report on a Business Organizations and Commercial Law Clin-
ic, 45 J. LEGAL EDUc. 283 (1995).
75. For a description of how such additional simulations might function, see
Moliterno, supra note 41, at 111-17.
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Practice-setting differentiation allows a focus on the varying cul-
tures of practice and the attendant differences in the law and
ethics of lawyering that attach to the various practice settings.
Creating experiential models for the education of lawyers that
are about the ways lawyers behave, professional ethics, and pro-
fessional techniques, can usefully advance the teaching and
learning of professional ethics law and practice.
